Planitz H. Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Arrestprozesses, II. Kapital, der Fremdenarrest // Zeitschrift de Savigny-Stifung fuer Rechtsgeschichte (Germanistische Abteilung). 1919. Bd. 40. S. 87-198.
Platteau J.-P. Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist. Part II: The Role of Moral Norms // Journal of Development Studies. 1994. Vol. 30. No. 3. P 753–817.
Platteau J.-P. Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000.
Platteau J.P., Gaspart F. The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development // World Development. 2003. Vol. 31. No. 10. P. 1687–1703.
Platteau J.-P., Hayami Y. Resource Endowments and Agricultural Development: Africa versus Asia / M. Aoki, Y. Hayami (eds). The Institutional Foundations of East Asian Economic Development, 357–410. London: Macmillan, 1998.
Plucknett T.F.T. Legislation of Edward I. Oxford: Clarendon, 1949.
Pollock F., Maitland F.W. The History of the English Law before the Time of Edward I. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
PomeranzK. The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Posner R.A. Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach // Papers and Proceedings from the 104th Meeting of the American Economic Association. American Economic Review. 1997. Vol. 87. No. 2. P. 333–338.
Postan M.M. Medieval Trade and Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Pounds N.J.G. An Economic History of Medieval Europe. 2nd ed. N.Y.: Longman, 1994.
Powell R. Guns, Butter, and Anarchy // American Political Science Review. 1993. Vol. 87. No. 1. P. 115–132.
Powell R. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Powell W., DiMaggio P. (eds). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Poznanski S. Ephraim ben Schemria de Fustat (in French and Hebrew) // Revue des Etudes Juives. 1904. Vol. 48. P. 146–175.
Pryor F.L. The Origins of the Economy: A Comparative Study of Distribution and Peasant Economies. N.Y.: Academic Press, 1977.
Pryor J. Geography, Technology, and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Przeworski A. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Putnam R.D. Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Putnam R.D. Bowling Alone. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
Rabin M. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics // American Economic Review. 1993. Vol. 83. No. 5. P. 1281–1302.
Rabin M. Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change // Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 1994. Vol. 23. No. 2. P. 177–194.
Rabin M. Psychology and Economics // Journal of Economic Literature. 1998. Vol. 36. No. 1. P. 11–46.
Rahman F. Islam. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
Rapoport A. Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form // International Journal of Game Theory. 1997. Vol. 26. No. 1. P. 113–136.
Rashdal H. The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages / F.M. Powicke, A.B. Emden (eds). Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936.
Rauch J.E. Business and Social Networks in International Trade // Journal of Economic Literature. 2001. Vol. 39 (Dec.). P. 1177–1203.
Razi Z. The Myth of the Immutable English Family // Past & Present. 1993. Vol. 140 (Aug.). P. 3–44.
Rey E. Les seigneurs de giblet // Revue de l’Orient Latin Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1895. Vol. 3. P. 398–422.
Reynolds C.H., Norman R.V. (eds). Community in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Reynolds R.L. The Market for Northern Textiles in Genoa 1179–1200 // Revue Belge Philologie et d’Historie. 1929. Vol. 8. P 831–851.
Reynolds R.L. Merchants of Arras and the Overland Trade with Genoa in the Twelfth Century // Revue Belge Philologie et d’Histoirie. 1930. Vol. 9. P 495–533.
Reynolds R.L. Genoese Trade in the Late Twelfth Century, Particularly in Cloth from the Fair of Champagne // Journal of Economic and Business History. 1931. Vol. 3. P 362–381.
Richardson G. Craft Guilds and Christianity in Late-Medieval England: A Rational-Choice Analysis. Memo: University of California, Irvine, 2002.
Riker W Federalism: Origins, Operations, and Significance. Boston: Little Brown, 1964.
Rippin A. Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices. The Formative Period. Reprint. Vol. 1. London: Routledge, 1994.
Rodrik D. Growth Strategies. Memo: Harvard University. Forthcoming in The Handbook of Economic Growth, 2003.
Rodrik D., Subramanian A., Trebbi F. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Memo: Harvard University, 2003.
Roland G. Transitions and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
Romer P. Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement / V.R. Fuchs (ed.). The Individual and Social Responsibility, 195–220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Root H.L. Tying the King’s Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime // Rationality and Society. 1989. Vol. 1 (Oct.). P 240–258.
Root H.L. The Fountain of Privilege: Political Foundations of Markets in Old Regime France and Englands. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Rorig F. The Medieval Town. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Rosenberg N. Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Rosenberg N., Birdzell L.E., Jr. How the West Grew Rich. N.Y.: Basic Books, 1986.
Rosenthal J.-L. The Fruits of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Ross L., Nisbett R.E. The Person and the Situation. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
Rossetti G., Pratesi M.C., Garzella G., Guzzardi M.B., Guglie G., Sturmann C. Pisa nei secoli XI e XII: Formazione e caratteri di una classe di governo. Pisa: Pacini Editore, 1979.
Roth A.E., Prasnikar V., Okuno-Fujiwara M., Zamir S. Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study // American Economic Review. 1991. Vol. 81. No. 5. P. 1068–1095.
Roth A.E., Erev I. Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in Intermediate Term // Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue: Nobel Symposium. 1995. Vol. 8. P. 164–212.
Rothstein B. Political Institutions: An Overview // R. Goodin, H.-D. Klingemann (eds). A New Handbook of Political Science, 133–166. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Rubinstein A. Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory // Econometrica. 1991. Vol. 59. No. 4. P 909–924.
Rubinstein A. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
Sachs J.D. Tropical Underdevelopment // NBER Working Paper. 2001. No. 8119.
Salzman L.F. A Riot at Boston Fair // History Teachers’ Miscellany. 1928. Vol. 6. P. 2–3.
Samuelson P.A. Altruism as a Problem Involving Group versus Individual Selection in Economics and Biology // American Economic Review. 1993. Vol. 83. No. 2. P 143–148.
Santini P. Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata e Sulle Rappresaglie // Archivo Strico Italiano. 1886. Vol. 18. P 162–176.
Saunders J.J. A History of Medieval Islam. N.Y.: Routledge, 1965.
Savage L.J. The Foundations of Statistics. N.Y.: Wiley&Sons, 1954.
Schacht J. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982 [1964].
Scharpf F.W. Games Real Actors Play. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997.
Schelling T. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Schneider G., Plumper T., Baumann S. Bringing Putnam to the European Regions – on the Relevance of Social Capital for Economic Growth // European Urban and Regional Studies. 2000. Vol. 7. No. 4. P 307–317.
Schotter A. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Schumann R. Italy in the Last Fifteen Hundred Years. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992.
Scott W.R. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1998.
Scott W.R. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995.
Scott W.R., Meyer J.W. et al. Institutional Environments and Organizations. London: Sage Publications, 1994.
Searle J.R. The Construction of Social Reality. N.Y.: Free Press, 1995.
Segal I. Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts // Review of Economic Studies. 1999. Vol. 66. No. 1. P 57–82.
Segal R. Islam’s Black Slaves. N.Y.: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.
Segal U., Sobel J. Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings: Memo. University of California, San Diego, 2000.
Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant, A.D. 1270–1638. Vol. 1: Local Courts. 1908 / Charles Gross (ed.). Seiden Society Publications, 23. London: B. Quaritch.
Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant, A.D. 1239–1633. Vol. 2: Central Courts. 1930 / H. Hall (ed.). Selden Society Publications, 46. London: B. Quaritch.