If official royal propaganda appealed first of all to vassal fidelity and patriotism, then "public opinion" was more guided by the private interests and individual expectations of the population. It is reasonable that, for each of participant of any war, there would be various individual motives causing them to take up arms. Representatives of all social strata without exception must have had a personal stake if they were to endure the hardships of war for years. The range of these private motives was wide enough: from aspirations to personal glory or fear of losing one's knightly honour, to materialistic desires to build up wealth by plundering enemy territory. This last circumstance particularly concerned the conflict with France, for during the period of the Hundred Years' War in English society the idea steadily developed that wars in France promised material welfare and prosperity to each Englishman individually and to the English kingdom as a whole. Already during the first stage of the war, the myth of successful commoners who gained not only martial honour and glory, but also titles and wealth through fighting, had arisen in the English society and become rather popular. As chroniclers testified, in the 14lh and 15lh centuries many young people in England dreamed of imitating the careers of glorified mercenaries and famous brigands. Even noble knights seeking fame did not forget about the lucre they could acquire in a successful campaign. Statutes and historical writings demonstrate that all strata of society were interested in ransom for captives, from peasants to kings. According to French sources, soldiers of the English garrison regularly kidnapped men and women and held them captives for the purpose of obtaining ransom. Pillaging and murder tended to be considered as crimes only when towards one's own country and in peacetime. Beyond the borders of the kingdom these actions were interpreted differently, namely as harming the prosperity of the enemy and hence serving the noble mission of re-establishing justice. From time to time the English prepared special military operations for the purpose of pillaging. As a rule, English chroniclers tried to explain such actions as the natural desire of their countrymen to avenge their suffering and losses; even the vengefulness and obvious cruelty of the English troops were described as evidence of the English tirelessly striving for justice.
Meanwhile, despite the popularity of the idea of war as a guarantee of English prosperity, it could never be reflected in official documents proceeding from the royal court. At each stage of every conflict the English crown invariably emphasised that war was the only means of achieving an honourable peace. In the framework of medieval mentality, for which the analysis of war into religious categories was typical, violation of divine law and justice was treated as a sinful act to be punished, even through armed conflict if necessary. Peace, just like war, directly depended on justice: abuse of the law required retribution. War was a way of establishing law and order and restoring lost peace, the foundation of peace rather than the alternative to it. Without restoration of violated justice, peace lost its value and was condemned in the same way as an unjust mercenary war. The theme of condemnation of any truce with enemies without the absolute restoration of justice was a major motive in English political and historical literature. Thus, English adherents of the conception of the just war resolutely condemned not only "the shameful peace" with Scotland concluded in 1328, or the truce with France in 1347, but also the treaty of Bretigny signed in 1360, which is traditionally viewed by modem scholars as a great success of English diplomacy. The fact that this treaty was unpopular in France is beyond question. However the sources tell us that many English people were also dissatisfied with this venture, interpreting it as a shameful renunciation of the ultimate goal — the return of the crown to the rightful king.
From the point of view of the majority of English authors the only worthy peace with France was concluded at Troyes in 1420: by its terms Henry V was proclaimed the successor and the regent of the French crown. It is noteworthy that after the ratification of this treaty, the English parliament practically ceased to finance military campaigns in France, assuming that the English had already discharged their vassal duty to the sovereign, and leaving the costs of suppressing "rebellions" entirely to the French.
Against the background of a stable official ideology, which was reflected in the chroniclers' conceptions of history, one might do well to ask whether the wars of the 14th and the 15th centuries, especially the Hundred Years' War, introduced something exceptionally new to the English national consciousness, whether there is a reason to believe that they affected English national identity differently than, say, earlier wars with France or Scotland. In my opinion, the main difference between the wars of the Late Middle Ages and the previous epoch consists in the appearance of the notion of a certain state interest, to which all members of the society (including the sovereign) were subservient. Thus, the Hundred Years' war, which began and was represented as a typically feudal dynastic conflict and was evidently aimed to restore the legitimate authority of the Plantagenets and their descendants on the French throne, at some point became every Englishman's business. In this context the case of Richard II is revealing, since his attempts to make peace with France were treated as treason. His refusal to continue the struggle for the French crown resulted in his losing the English throne. Henry of Lancaster is portrayed in historical works as the Lord's instrument for punishment of the traitor king who cruelly and unjustly tyrannised his subjects and disdained the divine law which all kings of England must protect. The king's aspiration to follow his own desires or convictions (including Christian peace) in the determination of the foreign policy appeared to his subjects as the first step on the path from true sovereign to tyrant. The beginning of this metamorphosis lay not in Richard's innate disposition towards vice, but in fact in the attitude, traditional for a feudal epoch, to the war with France as his own affair. From the English authors' point of view, Richard II was not merely a sinner and a bad ruler but also the enemy of his own people. The history of Richard's dethronement perfectly testifies that already in the 14th century prolonged military conflicts, in particular the wars in France and Scotland, were starting to be interpreted as pertaining to the state and national interest. Not that every war was so interpreted: for example, John Gaunt's Castilian campaign was laid out as a war for the purpose of protecting the rights of the true claimant to the throne, whilst remaining his personal business. The Duke of Lancaster had not only the full authority to wage this war, but also was permitted to finish it on any terms acceptable to him. On the whole the appearance of the notion of a certain state interest in foreign policy may be considered the main change introduced into English national identity by the wars of the 14th — 15th centuries.
At the same time, the English obviously experienced ambivalent feelings towards "their" France. On the one hand they aimed to conquer it, but on the other hand the ambitious aspirations of the crown to unite the insular and the continental possessions were resisted by English society due to the desire to cement their political isolation. English resistance to the threat of political unification with the other subjects of their monarchs extended primarily to the French, while the prospect of "merging" with the other peoples of the British Isles was less frightening. It is remarkable that even during the periods of greatest military success on the continent, English kings issued, under pressure from Parliament, protective statutes reinforcing the "national isolation" of the English Kingdom.
Returning to the problem of the formation of the idea of a collective state interest in English society during the 14lh — 15th century wars, it is significant that at the last stage of the Hundred Years' War, a new purpose arose for English foreign policy. At that time, certain authors began to contend that the true prosperity of England consisted not in possession of the French crown, but was limited to the British Isles and control of the seaways. Gradually, it was the kingdom of England and its national interests that became the major object of foreign policy, instead of the personal aspirations of sovereigns or the protection of an abstract higher justice.
One more change in the perception of military conflicts, outlined during the Late Middle Ages and further developed in the Modem period, consists in the idea of war as a "normal" element of foreign policy. During the 14th and 15th centuries, the interpretation of any war was traditionally accompanied by reasoning on human sins, divine punishment and the struggle for justice, but meanwhile there was already a tendency to understand military actions as a lawful way of defending national interests, as well as a logical and even "natural" way to achieve a given objective; a form of foreign policy only slightly more radical than diplomatic negotiations.
During the periods of extended foreign conflict when a community requires "proofs" of its hereditary superiority over the enemy, the interest of historians and other members of society in a heroic past invariably becomes stronger. The collective memory of the glorious events of national history is one of the most important factors of national self-consciousness. In the period of the Hundred Years' War, English collective ideas of the national past possessed a typical set of the characteristics inherent in ethno-political myths. Examples include identification of ancestors with a glorious ancient people; exaggeration of said ancestors' various achievements, etc. From its overall memory of the past, society selected the most vital and topical episodes of history, which in the course of time could fade into oblivion or receive new meanings. However, the mere fact of manipulation of history for propagandistic purposes does not testify to the maturity of national consciousness. There is a more important issue: any attempt to correct important community legends was unequivocally recognized as a discrediting and dangerous act, even as an encroachment on the sanctum sanctorum of that society, and demanded immediate refutation.